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Chapter 7 – Public inquiry and arguments 
over performing rights 
 
The Royal Commission on Performing Rights 
The Commission 
The Royal Commission on Performing Rights heard evidence from 23 
September 1932 until 20 March 1933 – a protracted inquiry, as the 
Commissioner noted in his closing remarks. The inquiry held 67 
sittings, heard evidence from 60 witnesses and registered 169 exhibits. 
The number of parties represented, and the complexity of evidence, 
slowed proceedings. A shoestring budget also retarded progress.  
In the midst of Depression, the Government could spare little money 
for public inquiries. The Royal Commissioner, Sir William Langer 
Owen, a retired judge of the NSW Supreme Court offered his services 
free of charge (an offer gratefully accepted by Latham),1 and conducted 
proceedings without the assistance of fellow commissioners. He 
received administrative assistance from a Commission secretary and 
invaluable help from a giant from Australia’s vanished days of 
independent copyright law-making – John Keating. Latham shrewdly 
appointed Keating, the key parliamentary figure in the preparation of 
the 1905 Copyright Act, and now a venerable member of the 
Melbourne Bar, as Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission. 
The Commission conducted proceedings on government premises, 
occupying the seventh floor of the Commonwealth Bank building in 
Sydney. Despite its straitened circumstances, the Commission 
functioned as a model of efficiency. The transcripts of evidence 
indicate that Owen marshalled the evidence with skill and courtesy and 
both he and Keating traversed the complicated and deceptive terrain of 
performing rights with clear sight and sure feet.  
                                                     
1 Justice Owen also waived his travel allowance for NSW travel, as his NSW judge’s 
pass covered train fares in the State. He asked that if his daily expenses for travel 
outside NSW were smaller than his daily allowance, he only be reimbursed for the 
amount actually spent. 
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Both men were well fitted for the task before them. During hearings, 
Keating showed, as he did in the Senate copyright debates in 1905 and 
1912, humour, penetrating mind, a gift for advocacy and prodigious 
knowledge of copyright history. Owen, a tall man distinguished by a 
handlebar moustache, helped found the NSW Bar in 1896. An upright, 
courteous individual, the father of Sir William Owen, a High Court 
judge between 1961 and 1972, he displayed high intellect and strong 
moral purpose.  
Looking down on Martin Place from Owen’s rooms, the pair discussed 
the evidence in the early morning and late at night, as Owen said in 
closing remarks, and reached conclusions that prepared the ground for 
the creation, nearly 40 years later, of the Australian Copyright Tribunal. 
Keating began proceedings on 23 September 1932. He explained that 
while the inquiry would provide APRA and the commercial users of 
music the opportunity to explain fully their differences over the terms 
of use, both he and the Commissioner would adopt the principle that 
the public’s interest in hearing public performances of music must not 
be unreasonably curtailed. Writing to the Attorney General three days 
later, Owen said that Keating’s address “was very able, very impartial, 
and gave great satisfaction to all who were present.” 
Owen went on to explain that he had ordered that the first part of 
proceedings would concentrate on relations between the national 
broadcasting stations2 (the ABC) and APRA. To enable the parties to 
prepare their cases, evidence and information, he adjourned 
proceedings to 4 October. He then proposed to examine APRA’s 
relations with the B Class broadcasters. To avoid expense and delay, the 
Commission hoped to collect as much of its evidence as possible in 
Sydney, but Owen indicated that he would be prepared to hear 
evidence in Melbourne and any other capital city if necessary. 
The barristers for the main contending parties filled the Commission’s 
hearing room in the Commonwealth Bank Building for most days of 
proceedings. With so much at stake, and the ever-present possibility of 
one interest group attacking or implicating another, the various counsel, 
even when not presenting evidence, rarely left their listening posts for 
more than a few days. The seniority of the lawyers filing in each day 
before Owen indicated plainly to the Commissioner the deadly 
commercial intent of their hirers.  
                                                     
2 Still also known as the ‘A Class’ stations. 
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The King’s Counsel Horace Markell and Reginald Bonney, leaders of 
the Sydney Bar and later judges,3 represented, respectively, APRA and 
the record manufacturers, the two factions resisting government 
intervention in the war over performing rights. APRA engaged Frank 
Kitto, the future High Court judge, as Markell’s junior. The B Class 
broadcasting stations hired gifted though relatively junior lawyers to 
represent them – first Clive Evatt (made KC in 1935) and then Richard 
Cook, described by Owen during proceedings as “one of the most able 
young men we have at the Bar”.4 In 1955, Cook the son of Australia’s 
sixth minister Joseph Cook, became a judge of the NSW Industrial 
Relations Commission. Mr H P Williams, the General Manager of the 
ABC, though not a lawyer, represented his organisation, as Owen said 
in his Report, “with marked ability”.  
Breakdown of negotiations over radio ban  
When the Royal Commission resumed proceedings in October 1932, 
Williams, on behalf of the ABC, and Markell, for APRA, addressed 
Owen over several days. Outside events then suddenly interrupted the 
program of hearings foreshadowed by Owen in August. Negotiations 
over the terms on which B Class stations could use gramophone 
records broke down, with the result that the radio ban, in force for a 
year, now seemed destined to continue indefinitely.  
The commercial broadcasters were now highly alarmed. They were 
deprived for the foreseeable future of access to the latest record 
releases, and theoretically, the use of all records in their stock 
manufactured by the three record companies. Relying on importing 
records of mostly inferior quality from foreign suppliers unaffiliated 
with EMI, the stations expressed doubts about their continued financial 
viability. Owen reacted immediately to the failure of negotiations. He 
asked Bonney to explain why the associated manufacturers considered 
                                                     
3 Markell joined the District Court bench in 1935 and Bonney the Supreme Court 
in 1940. 
4 Owen made this statement during Markell’s closing address. He said that Cook 
“gave one of the most able addresses I have ever had the pleasure of listening to, 
certainly for one of his years of the profession.” In his own final address, Bonney 
said that “we, too, feel that Mr Cook’s address to this Commission was an 
outstanding contribution, and as adversaries … we should like to offer our humble 
tribute to the masterly manner in which Mr Cook got a grip of the proceedings, and 
to his masterly conduct of them all through.” Cook replaced Evatt at short notice, 
and, as Bonney said, “came into this Commission under very difficult 
circumstances indeed.” 
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that they were entitled prohibit the playing of their records on radio 
and received an unequivocal response. The record companies, said 
Bonney, considered that under the Copyright Act and Patents Act, they 
could impose any conditions they saw fit on the public performance of 
their records.  
Owen and Keating were agitated. A Royal Commission intended to 
investigate commercial and legal issues surrounding APRA’s exercise of 
the performing right could now not avoid investigation the legality of 
the radio ban. Although Bonney at first did not specifically claim a 
performing right on behalf of his clients, Owen and Keating drew an 
obvious conclusion: if the record companies believed that they could 
control the public performance of records under copyright legislation, 
they must infer from their copyright in records manufactured a 
derivative right to perform the records in public. 
Adding to their difficulties, the two men knew that affiliated 
manufacturers in Britain and Europe were considering, or already 
implementing, similar bans. Leaving aside the effect on the unity of the 
Berne Union of international acceptance of a manufacturers’ 
performing right in records, such a right, if implemented, might 
derange the system of copyright payments that APRA laboured for 
nearly a decade to enforce. The commercial users of music, still 
reluctant to pay APRA’s performance fee, would be horrified at the 
thought of a second performance fee, and APRA itself could be 
expected to swiftly take up cudgels against the manufacturers if the new 
right undermined its profits. 
In short, chaos in the commercial world regulated by the Copyright Act 
threatened. In the end, APRA reacted with indifference to the claim for 
the manufacturers’ performing right. In October 1932, however, 
neither Owen nor Keating could guess at how the protagonists with 
whom they were soon to contend would react over time to the 
copyright implications of the radio ban. Owen responded to the 
uncertainty by contacting Latham, while Keating drafted additional 
terms of reference for the Commission to inquire into relations 
between the producers and commercial users of records. 
The gramophone companies lion 
Latham gained Cabinet’s approval for the proposed new commission, 
and wasted no time getting in touch with the former Prime Minister, 
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Stanley Bruce, now Minister-without-Portfolio in London.5 What 
information could he provide on the nature and extent of the claim for 
a performing made in Britain by record manufacturers? Bruce cabled 
his reply within 24 hours. The gramophone companies had labelled 
records to prohibit the BBC from playing their records without 
permission. They had declared their intention to charge fees for the 
public performance of records and “performances other than 
broadcasting [were] now the chief concern.” 
Significantly, the Performing Right Society had claimed, in the October 
edition of the Performing Right Gazette, the exclusive right to control the 
public performance of copyright music in any format or by any means, 
including records and broadcasting. The BBC, said Bruce in his 
telegram, “do not admit copyright but think Companies may have a 
claim in equity, as unrestricted use would kill the sale of records.”6 
Joe Tipping, the copyright law specialist in Latham’s department, and 
an observer at the Commission hearings, wrote to Keating a few days 
later enclosing a copy of Bruce’s communication. He explained that 
Thompson v Warner Bros, a 1929 English High Court case cited by Bruce, 
established that the law permitted “only one performing right”.  
For Tipping the meaning of the case for the Royal Commission seemed 
clear. “On this decision, the gramophone companies have no right to 
claim performing fees under the Copyright Act and a conflict between 
them and APRA is certain.” Though Markell, APRA’s senior counsel at 
the Royal Commission hearings, “was inclined to treat the gramophone 
companies proposals as no concern of APRA”, claims for fees for 
playing records “must ultimately cause a fight between the record 
manufacturers and APRA.” 
Tipping shared his opinion that the radio ban unmasked the real power 
in the business of supplying and using copyright music. The proposed 
agreement between the associated manufacturers and B Class stations – 
now discarded by the record companies – “shows how serious the 
matter is for those Stations”. APRA, he said, “is a lamb altogether 
                                                     
5 The Prime Minister, Joe Lyons, sent Bruce to London partly to ensure that he did 
not become a threat to his position. Bruce led the Australian delegation to the 
Ottowa Convention and in 1933 accepted the position of High Commissioner to 
London. 
6 The BBC was negotiating an agreement with the gramophone companies that 
would restrict it to playing records for 14 hours a week and require it to 
acknowledge the provenance of records played. 
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compared to the gramophone companies lion.” Tipping informed 
Keating that he felt little optimism about the possibility of government 
resolving commercial impasses created by either the APRA lamb or 
gramophone company lion.  
The latter constituted “another monopoly – the same as the music 
publishers have their monopoly”. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth’s 
powers to legislate against monopolies were “nil” and the Government 
could only overcome the deficit in constitutional power by seeking 
constitutional amendment. Tipping closed his letter with welcome 
practical news. The Governor General had signed the new commission 
containing the additional terms of reference. The Royal Commission 
could inquire into issues arising between the record companies and  
the radio broadcasters and the basis on which the manufacturers 
claimed fees for, and imposed conditions on, the public performance of 
their records.7 
Position of the main parties  
Now empowered to investigate the legal questions arising between the 
associated manufacturers and the commercial broadcasters, Owen and 
Keating resumed their inquiry. The motives of the parties involved  
in the inquiry were clearer and as hearings continued, their  
intentions became unmistakable. A week after the close of proceedings, 
when Owen retired to his home in Bellevue Hill to write his  
report, and Keating to Selborne Chambers in Melbourne, the  
latter wrote to the Attorney General enclosing a memorandum 
summarising his observations of the material disclosed, and suggesting 
legislative reforms.  
                                                     
7 The new commission added two terms of reference to the two original terms of 
reference. The commission asked Owen to inquire and report upon – 
(c) any questions that have arisen or may arise between persons interested in the manufacture, use 
or sale of any mechanical contrivances by means of which any musical or other work may be 
mechanically performed, whether so interested under or by virtue of the Copyright Act 1912 or 
otherwise, and persons interested or concerned in using such contrivances for the purpose of 
mechanically performing such musical or other works in public, whether as persons authorizing or 
controlling such performance, or as persons on whose premises such performance takes place, or 
otherwise; and 
(d) the rates, methods and conditions of payment (if any) to the persons interested as aforesaid in 
the manufacture, use or sale of such contrivances by the persons interested or concerned as aforesaid 
in using such contrivances for the purpose of mechanically performing such musical or other works 
in public. 
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A single paragraph in his letter candidly outlined the motives of the two 
most powerful commercial entities represented at the Commission. 
Keating told Latham that: 
In reading the enclosed Memorandum it should be remembered that the general 
attitude of Counsel for A.P.R.A. and Counsel for the Associated Manufacturers 
throughout the Inquiry might be summed up as if they said: “We want to be left 
alone. There is no need for any legislation to solve present or future problems 
adverted to here. Leave them to us to settle by private negotiation. The public in 
general is not interested in, nor affected by, these ‘problems’. The Federal Parliament 
may have the power to legislate regarding them. But it can only do so by conflicting 
with International Convention and the British Copyright Act of 1911, thus 
excluding Australia from the International Copyright Union and from the Inter-
Imperial Copyright System.”  
The commercial users of music, as the evidence before Owen soon 
revealed, were united by an opposing aspiration. They, led by the ABC 
and the commercial broadcasters, whose complaints were most 
responsible for the creation of the Royal Commission, wanted the 
Copyright Act to establish procedures for the mandatory arbitration of 
licensing disputes, preferably by a dedicated tribunal.  
The polarity of opinions expressed by APRA and the associated 
manufacturers on the one hand, and the users of commercial music on 
the other, should not have surprised Owen or Keating. The Copyright 
Act gave APRA, as assignee of musical copyright, all that it could ask 
for – the unlimited capacity to enforce the performing right. 
Compulsory arbitration, the institution of a tribunal, each represented a 
potential roadblock on the journey to the creation of an efficient and 
lucrative system for remunerating the use of copyright musical works.  
The gramophone companies did not benefit so directly from copyright 
legislation. But if left alone to pursue their objectives through the 
ordinary business channels of negotiation and ultimatum they could 
confidently expect to control the public performance of their records. 
They disliked the idea of compulsory arbitration because adjudication 
required that they surrender control of dispute resolution to an 
independent authority. After 30 years of extraordinary economic 
growth they felt no wish to allow third parties to intrude into disputes 
they could settle on their own terms.  
As became clear when Reginald Bonney, the companies’ senior counsel, 
expounded his arguments, the associated manufacturers saw no need 
for conciliation. Their profit statements did not justify Tipping’s 
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description of them as a “lion” but their parent EMI was a true giant 
whose revenues, profits and assertiveness imbued its Australian 
subsidiaries with the unshakeable belief that in commercial disputes 
they must enforce their will by compulsion. 
The radio ban duplicated an embargo imposed by the British 
gramophone industry (on the BBC’s playing of music), and Bonney 
repeated the justification given in Britain for prohibition. Copyright in a 
recording, he said, entailed a right of public performance, and nothing 
prevented the record companies from enforcing the right to stop 
broadcasters from playing their recordings. If the Royal Commission 
proposed to recommend any amendment to the copyright legislation, it 
should be to explicitly recognise the manufacturers’ performing right.  
The stunned Royal Commissioner, and the various representatives of 
commercial music users assembled before him saw the matter 
differently. Owen asserted that his commission did not authorise him 
to recommend legislation to recognise the performing right for which 
Bonney argued. Throughout proceedings, he remained fixed on the 
idea that only the creation of a quasi-judicial forum for determining 
disputes would bring order and some harmony to relations between the 
various parties presenting their arguments to him. 
As for the users, they cried out to Owen for deliverance from the cruel 
ordinances of copyright law – or at least their amelioration. From the 
middle of the 1920s, motivated by outrage and economic exigency, they 
fought APRA with degrees of resolve and prevarication, and always 
unsuccessfully. For them – the radio broadcasters, cinematograph 
exhibitors, owners of entertainment venues and miscellaneous other 
users of commercial music – the Royal Commission represented a 
welcome opportunity to expose APRA’s perceived venality, and obtain 
protection from what they saw as its ceaselessly growing imposts.  
For the commercial radio stations, the Commission presented an 
opportunity on two fronts. They had no wish to pay more to APRA, 
and argued pointedly that they could not afford to pay much in 
performing right fees. But they wanted above all to bring to Owen’s 
notice the evils of the radio ban, and discredit the record companies’ 
legal justifications for the embargo under patent and copyright law.  
Outline of proceedings 
All the categories of music user accepted that they could not persuade 
Owen to recommend abolition of the performing right. But they were 
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agreed on one general action that might check APRA’s appetite for 
revenue: the creation of a third party adjudicator to whom the parties 
must refer unresolved licensing disputes. Owen and Keating  
accepted the necessity for such an adjudicator and working out how  
an arbitral tribunal might work in practice became a primary focus of 
their attention.  
After hearing Williams for the ABC, and Markell for APRA, in October 
1932 and then part of November, Owen took evidence from Evatt for 
the B Class stations and Bonney for the record companies. Over 
December and into the New Year he heard from an extensive list of 
witnesses, including Bluett the secretary for the NSW Local 
Government Association, APRA’s active opponent since the mid 
1920s. In February and March 1933, he invited the biggest commercial 
concerns represented at the Commission – APRA and the record 
companies on one side, and the users of music, the radio broadcasters, 
and to a lesser extent, the cinema exhibitors, on the other – to address 
him again.  
As Keating told Latham in his letter, APRA and the gramophone 
industry wanted government inaction. With art and industry, they 
pressed their arguments against official intrusion into the relations 
between the providers and users of commercial music. Owen, however, 
listened more sympathetically as the broadcasters conjured a vision of a 
primitive commercial world in which APRA and the record companies 
roamed free like angry dinosaurs, ready to consume any business that 
stood in their paths.  
Though the hostility between the users and controllers of commercial 
music became apparent early in proceedings, the specific enmities of 
different parties emerged more slowly. Predictably, APRA attracted 
criticism from many quarters. The cinematograph exhibitors and other 
user groups, such as the Local Government Association of NSW, were 
outraged by the ever-growing size of annual copyright fees and joined 
in a concentrated attack on APRA’s licensing policy. But the most 
cogent criticism came from H P Williams, General Manager and 
counsel for the ABC. 
The ABC 
Williams told Owen that compared to the levies fixed for the B Class 
radio stations, the licence fees paid by the ABC to APRA were 
ridiculously high. In 1931, the year before the Royal Commission 
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began, the amount of total annual copyright royalty paid by to APRA 
by the ABC’s predecessor was more than nine times greater than total 
fees paid by the commercial stations. Why, said Williams, should the 
ABC pay rates inflated to capitalise on the boon of government 
revenue allocations? 
Williams also attacked the argument that in setting broadcasting fees, 
APRA was entitled to take into consideration the effect of the 
gramophone and broadcasting on sales of sheet music. As he said, 
“mechanical presentation is but a stage in the march of progress and 
therefore permits of no retrospective compensation.” The real motives 
of APRA, he suggested, could be discerned from its policy of taxing 
government (represented by the ABC) more heavily than any other user 
of commercial music. 
APRA, he implied, made a mercenary decision to take advantage of the 
ABC because it, as a public utility, stood in the position of a willing 
buyer. It accepted the legal obligation to pay licence fees and would not 
fight to the death over the amount. APRA taxed the ABC most heavily 
because it could, not because the ABC placed the greatest value on 
commercial music, or because the music supplied commanded, by 
some other measure, a higher price. Williams said: 
My Commission stoutly contests the suggestion that because a licence fee is paid by 
listeners for the services from its stations, this permits the holders of copyrights to 
make an inequitable charge … I respectfully submit that here again we find the 
attitude of APRA influenced not by concern for the composer and author, but  
the by an intensive effort to constitute a new source of revenue for the music houses 
and publishers. 
After Williams’ address, the B Class stations told Owen simply that 
they, unlike the ABC, could not afford to pay higher fees. But they 
were not primarily concerned with the depredations of APRA. They 
concentrated mostly on questions raised by the record companies and 
they could hardly afford to do otherwise. For concentrated vitriol, no 
speeches by other barristers at the hearings matched those of Reginald 
Schofield Bonney, the counsel for the associated manufacturers, as he 
attacked the motives and usefulness of the commercial radio stations.  
“A noisome weed” 
Bonney expressed the antagonism of the manufacturers in polite 
sentences that disclosed intensity of feeling and destructive intent. As 
his argument unfolded the real wish of his clients became clear. 
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Attributing falling sales to the repeated playing of recorded music, and 
fearing that broadcasting might fatally undermine profits, the associated 
manufacturers wanted the commercial stations banned. Bonney never 
directly voiced this radical aspiration, and instead emphasised the 
wisdom of licensing a single national broadcaster – like the BBC – to 
supply radio programming to the nation. 
He left his listeners in no doubt that the gramophone companies 
considered commercial broadcasting a threat to their existence, and the 
radio ban a rational response to the reckless conduct of the B Class 
stations. He tried particularly hard to show that unlike the ABC,  
the commercial broadcasters did not serve the public interest.  
They were motivated by profit alone and cared little for the sensibilities 
of the their audience, which endured advertisements every three or  
so minutes.  
The national broadcaster, said Bonney catered to all levels of public 
demand. It satisfied the public’s demand for music and its diverse 
programming, including broadcasts of Test cricket, catered to a wider 
variety of tastes than did the programming of all the B Class stations. 
Yes, he responded to Owen, a certain amount of commercial 
broadcasting did provide welcome publicity for the latest record 
releases. But B Class broadcasters had long since passed the 
“saturation” point at which broadcasting began to exercise a negative 
effect on record sales. Music played over and over on the radio meant 
listeners became sick of songs long before they wanted to buy the 
recording. Commercial broadcasting, said Bonney, “has grown up not 
as a handsome plant but as a noisome weed.” 
As to the effects of the radio ban on commercial broadcasting, the 
record companies were not perturbed by the possibility of driving some 
stations out of business and depriving their listeners of music. “Of 
course my contention is,” said Bonney, “to put it in all its bluntness 
simply that there is no need to come to terms.” Bonney called the claim 
of broadcasters that the ban would drive some to extinction pure 
speculation. The evidence of one station manager, he said, showed that 
the previous year had been a successful one for the industry, 10 new 
stations had come into existence since the ban, and two stations had 
increased the price of advertising to cash in on demand.  
While Bonney made no apology for the radio ban or its possible 
effects, he pointed out that it hardly constituted as frightening a threat 
to the B class stations as they pretended. When the commercial 
 
199 
broadcasters pushed for the holding of a Royal Commission at the 
beginning of 1932, a few months after imposition of the ban, they did 
not mention their dispute with the record companies, or the ban itself. 
Instead, they focused on APRA, asking the Government for a public 
inquiry into the activities of APRA and the musical performing right. 
The public, said Bonney, would not be disturbed if the ban drove some 
stations to the wall. Before the ban, he observed, recorded music was 
“broadcast morning, noon and night, with the result that people were 
getting rather sickened of music as home entertainment.” Owen 
responded bluntly. “I think the opinions as to there being too much 
music on the air depends very much on the state of the liver of the man 
giving evidence. It is a matter of opinion.” 
The Royal Commissioner seemed unimpressed by Bonney’s other 
arguments. Nothing suggested that the Government wished to undo 
the policy of the 1920s, which called for the co-existence of commercial 
and public radio to diversify programming and extend broadcasting 
into all parts of the country. Whether or not commercial broadcasters 
intended to benefit the public he considered beside the point. They 
provided a public benefit, whatever their motivation, and their owners 
supplied funds, that government could not, for creating a truly national 
broadcasting system.  
That broadcasting undermined record sales Owen thought debatable: 
one factor in the decline of sales could be the unwillingness of 
consumers to spend on records during a period of severe economic 
depression.8 As to the relative merits of ABC programming compared 
with that of the commercial stations, if radio advertising offended 
Bonney’s sensibilities, Owen did not propose to waste any time 
debating questions of taste that were irrelevant to the biggest question 
before him. 
The gramophone companies oppose a tribunal 
On behalf of the associated manufacturers, Bonney rejected the idea of 
a tribunal to resolve copyright disputes. The “rights of property and 
rights of private contract,” he said, “should only be interfered  
with in extreme cases.” The radio ban did not invite government 
intervention: “why,” he asked Owen, “should Parliament be asked to 
                                                     
8 To which point Bonney responded that the public had spent £7 million on radio 
licences since 1925 and continued in large numbers to buy radio sets at the 
considerable cost of £27 10s per receiver. 
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intercede in what is purely a business dispute, a business difference 
between two parties?” 
Certainly not, he suggested, on public interest grounds: 
Does the public interest demand that all the weight and power of Federal legislation 
should be brought to bear to save a few stations a few pounds?9 Surely the public 
interest does not demand that? All that public interest demands is that the public 
shall have a reasonable broadcasting service. 
Could, Bonney asked, a copyright tribunal understand the intricacies of 
commercial disputes? Left alone, would the parties not reach agreement 
more efficiently? As Bonney pointed out, “I have had some experience 
of arbitration and I may say that I could scarcely imagine a better way 
of sending the parties into liquidation.” The record companies opposed 
the concept of an arbitrator setting down the terms on which their 
records could be used by broadcasters.  
Arbitration, Bonney implied, offered a blunt instrument. His clients 
anticipated that arbitral or tribunal rulings in particular disputes would 
establish precedents that would be applied, with unfortunate results, to 
others. For example, an arbitrator or tribunal might decide that the 
terms of an arbitrated settlement fixing conditions of use by a public 
broadcaster should apply equally to commercial broadcasters. His 
clients, said Bonney, considered third party involvement in commercial 
disputes anathema: 
Any interference or control of that sort with a business is in itself an evil; it is a bad 
thing and should be avoided if possible; and it is a cause of action which in the case 
of a business which is struggling its hardest to make both ends meet – and it is not 
making both ends meet – which may make all the difference between that business 
continuing and it being scared out of existence. One has to take that view of 
government interference.  
Owen did not share Bonney’s pessimism. He considered the case for 
legislation to be simple and compelling and paraphrased the arguments 
of Richard Cook, counsel for the B Class stations: 
There should be some tribunal to determine the conditions if the parties cannot agree 
and there ought to be some machinery provided by the legislature whereby, if the 
tribunal determines the conditions, the B Class stations should be allowed to 
                                                     
9 The money saved referred to the cost of importing records from non-EMI 
sources. 
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broadcast your records providing they could show that they had offered to fulfil the 
conditions laid down by the tribunal. 
Rationale for the radio ban – the mechanical 
performance right 
Finally, Bonney and Owen turned to the vital legal question – on what 
basis did the associated manufacturers claim they were entitled to 
enforce a radio ban? Under the patents and copyright legislation, said 
Bonney. The former allegedly gave a right to control the use of a thing 
manufactured under patent, the second a right to control the 
performance of records. At the outset, Owen made clear that his 
commission did not ask him to – and nor could he – determine 
justiciable legal issues. At the same time, he could not ignore the 
question and pretend that the recording industry’s bold claim for a new 
right did not promise mischief for users and regulators alike. 
The claim for the mechanical performing right seems to have arisen 
directly from the British recording industry’s frustration at the 
seemingly disastrous effect of radio broadcasting on record sales. The 
record companies knew that banning the use of records by broadcasters 
under patent legislation entailed risk. Under section 87 of the Patents 
Act, a broadcaster “unfairly prejudiced” by the ban could sue for 
revocation of the patent (in this case to manufacture a record) and the 
Government could readily amend the legislation to prohibit the 
withholding of supply. 
By contrast, the declaration of a public performance right in records 
offered attractive possibilities as the gramophone companies fought to 
bring the radio industry to heel. If not opposed by government, the 
claimed right allowed record companies the choice of exercising potent 
alternatives: they could either ban radio stations from playing records, 
or allow them to play the records subject to whatever conditions they 
wished to impose, including the charging of public performance fees. 
When pressed by Owen on the question of the mechanical performing 
right, Bonney willingly confirmed the Commissioner’s worst fears. His 
clients were not prepared to say that the radio ban technically involved 
a ban of the public performance of records but they did assert the right 
to control such performances. On what basis, asked Owen? Because, 
replied Bonney, section 19 of the British Copyright Act (which 
provided for a compulsory licence to record works) created copyright 
in records “as if such contrivances were musical works”, and under 
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section 1 of the Act, copyright included the right of public 
performance. If, under the Act, copyright in a record subsisted “as if” it 
were a musical work, then the copyright in a record comprehended the 
performing right that attached directly to musical works.  
Bonney gave short shrift to the objection, raised earlier by Markell and 
Cook, and repeated by Owen, that the compulsory licence permitted a 
licensee only to record a work and control subsequent reproductions of 
the recording. According to the argument, the definition, in section 1(2) 
of copyright as the ‘sole right’ to produce or reproduce a work for 
various purposes, applied only to the owners of works – the owners of 
records made under compulsory licence were excluded. The makers of 
records and those reproducing records under compulsory licence could 
replicate their recordings, but not control their use for any other 
purpose. Bonney called the argument “the height of absurdity”. 
If, said Bonney, the Act regarded an original or licensed recording “as 
if” it were a musical work then the maker of the recordings, whether 
directly authorised or recording under compulsory licence, held the sole 
right to multiply the recordings for any of the purposes of copyright, 
including public performance. Owen then responded with the question 
that had exercised his mind for months.  
He agreed that the record company could be said to possess an implicit 
performance right. As he said, “in one sense you have the right of 
performance; you can yourselves perform or can give a licence to 
others to perform.” What interested him, he indicated to Bonney, was 
the “right to charge for performance”. A right to control the public 
performance of a thing included the right to demand fees for the 
licence to perform.  
According to the Royal Commissioner, a record company could 
prevent the piracy of records, but not charge performance fees. Owen 
justified his position by referring to the language of the compulsory 
licence in section 19. The licence referred to the making of records “by 
means of which the work may be mechanically performed”. In the 
Commissioner’s view, the mechanical act of playing a record did not 
constitute performance. As he said, the “performance of the work and 
the use of the contrivance are two entirely different things.” 
Bonney expressed the opposite view: “I submit firstly,” he said, “that 
the word ‘perform’ has exactly the same meaning as the word ‘play’.” 
Before the Gorrell Committee in 1909, he said, a number of witnesses, 
chief among them John Drummond Robertson of the Gramophone 
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Company (who contended strongly for the performing right in records) 
referred to the words interchangeably.  
The Act treated a record as if it were a musical work, thereby vesting, as 
Bonney reiterated, the public performance right in the owner of the 
record. The playing of a gramophone record in public was the 
mechanical analogue of the live acoustic performance of a musical 
work. Thus playing a record involved performance no less than a 
concert given by musicians. As Bonney pointed out, the definition of 
‘performance’ in the Act referred to “any acoustic representation of a 
work’. This definition, he concluded, “is sufficient for my purpose.” 
For Owen, the consequences of Bonney’s arguments succeeding before 
the courts raised a frightening prospect: two performing right fees, 
increased costs and probably commercial warfare. He emphasised that 
the Gorrell Committee had accepted the necessity for record makers to 
receive sufficient legal protection to allow them to prevent or attack the 
piracy of records. Reading section 19 in light of the Gorrell Report, he 
thought that legislators in 1911 intended copyright in records to 
comprise twin rights – the first to reproduce recordings and the second 
to prevent unauthorised reproduction. Bonney contended that the 
second right implied a performance right.  
Commissioner and counsel engaged in a sharp exchange that indicated 
Owen’s high mindedness and a certain naivety that Bonney gently 
disparaged. 
Mr Bonney What is the idea of protecting a person against the 
performance of a pirated article if he has no right 
whatever in the performance of the original?  
 
The Commissioner Because it is a wicked use of a pirated article. The 
man has robbed you of an article which you made at 
great expense. 
 
Mr Bonney Such legislation against wickedness in general is very 
rare. I submit they had in mind the protection of a 
right which is hurt by what is being done. 
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The Commissioner What injury is it to you, if by skill you have 
produced a record? 
 
Mr Bonney If I have no right of public performance it does not do 
me any injury for a pirate to perform 100 pirated 
works. 
 
The Commissioner Yes, it does, because people buy the pirated ones 
instead of yours. Your object is to keep up your sales 
not to collect fees for performances. 
Paying to listen 
Owen’s last point brought the discussion back to the nub of the 
question that preoccupied him. Was the law of copyright intended to 
establish a gigantic industrial system for imposing and collecting 
revenue or did it have a more limited purpose clearly founded in the 
doctrine of authors’ rights? Any observer who listened to the his 
comments throughout the hearings, particularly those addressed to 
Keating, could guess that Bonney’s reply filled him with foreboding. 
Bonney said of the broadcasting of recorded music: “it becomes 
necessary to ask whether in fairness the public who gets its enjoyment 
of those records through a new channel should not be called upon to 
pay.” The record companies must get return on investment. “There is 
no escape from that proposition,” said Bonney. “And if the sources of 
revenue that have accrued to them [the companies] in the past are cut 
off, then they must look for new avenues of revenue.” 
Pressed by Owen, who rejected the idea of imposing imposts on the 
public for the privilege of listening to music, he insisted that the 
commercial users of records should be obliged to pay public 
performance fees: 
[T]the person who uses that record in public for his own profit, who could not 
otherwise obtain that profit, should pay for it; does not justice require that those who 
have provided him with those means should be entitled to charge for it? 
Bonney reprised the arguments made 20 years before by Drummond 
Robertson during the British copyright debates of 1909 and 1911.  
The record companies produced records at great expense, bringing  
the benefits of performances by the best artists to private and public 
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audiences. Did not justice demand that anyone who benefited 
commercially from playing records should pay a price to the record 
company that made the benefit possible? Was not the technology  
that made the dissemination of works possible as valuable as the  
works themselves? 
The record manufacturer, said Bonney, deserved to receive more than 
the revenue received from the sale of chattels. If the owners of musical 
works were entitled to remuneration for the various uses of the work, 
then the manufacturers of records were entitled to claim a similar 
entitlement. Bonney declared: 
In each case one has a thing of value, a thing of value for the purpose of public 
performance; and if in the one case remuneration is fair because a thing of value is 
put in the hands of the user, then in the other case I submit it is equally fair that the 
originator or manufacturer of that thing of value should be entitled to charge in the 
same way for that public performance, the use of that in public by the broadcaster or 
whoever the user may be. 
Bonney’s case proceeded with certainty and logic. The transcript of 
evidence shows that when he summarised his argument in the form of 
a rhetorical question, the Commissioner’s reply disconcerted him: 
Mr Bonney If the performance of that [a recording] in public is of 
value to the public, why should not it be paid for? Is 
there any logical possible answer to that question? 
 
The Commissioner There is one answer that affects my mind to some 
extent, and that is since 1909 when you say that 
evidence was given up till 1933 it has never been 
suggested that they [the record companies] had such  
a right. 
 
Mr Bonney It has never been suggested that they have any  
such right? 
 
The Commissioner No. 
 
Mr Bonney Your Honour will pardon me. 
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Later, Owen asked Bonney:  
If it [the public performance right] is of such great value to you and you are so much 
entitled to this protection, one would have expected, would not one, that it would 
have been asserted? 
To this query, Bonney made no meaningful response. The belated 
discovery of a mechanical performing right could not affect in principle 
its legitimacy. But Owen identified an uncomfortable truth: the 
gramophone industry adduced the existence of the right in order to 
place the broadcasting ban on a more secure legal footing, then realised 
that it could also be relied on to claim performance fees. 
Owen wrote in his report that, “in England this claim to a performing 
right is being or is to be insisted upon against all users in public, 
whether broadcasters or not, and apparently the same claim is being 
made on the Continent.” To Bonney, he observed that the British High 
Court and the Victorian Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a 
mechanical performing right existed alongside the musical performing 
right.10 Having tossed dialectical gelignite at the Royal Commissioner, 
Bonney was sanguine: as he said, the industry in Britain had begun two 
test cases, and the courts would determine the question. 
It mattered little to the record companies if Owen agreed that the 
arguments for the right were correct. They did not expect the 
legislature to move quickly in their favour. What counted was that  
they could present defensible legal arguments to support the radio ban 
while they prepared to persuade the courts to recognise the right.  
Owen devoted little more than a page of his report to discussing the 
question of the mechanical performing right, but as the transcripts of 
evidence showed, he felt alarm at the possibility of users paying two 
performance fees.  
In his report he affirmed that copyright in a record vested in the 
manufacturer then asked, “was it intended that, by a grant of 
‘Copyright’, he should also be given a right of performance of the work 
incorporated in his record?” His answer indicated clearly his own 
position. It would, he said, “apparently lead to extraordinary results if 
Section 19 has given that right to the maker.” But the Commissioner 
refused to make any more definite statement on the merits of the 
                                                     
10 Thompson v Warner Bros (1929) Ch Div; Australasian Performing Right Association v 
3DB Broadcasting Company (1929) VSC. 
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record companies’ claim. His final words on the subject made clear that 
the legislature, not courts, should determine the question: 
The Commission is informed that litigation is pending in Great Britain in which 
this question will arise for decision, but the Commission considers that legislation by 
the Commonwealth Parliament is necessary in order to make the legal position clear. 
“A dragon, devastating the countryside” 
Described by Joe Tipping, copyright expert at the Attorney General’s 
Department, as “a lamb altogether next to the gramophone lion”, 
APRA, in the figurative sense, more closely resembled a dragon at the 
Royal Commission. Purcell, barrister for the Cinematograph Exhibitors 
Association, told the Commissioner that APRA began operations as the 
“watchdog of copyright holders’ rights” but now, “instead of being the 
watchdog … has become a dragon, devastating the countryside.” Its 
chief counsel, Horace Markell, breathed fire on its behalf, and, as 
Keating reported later to Latham, staked a simple position identical to 
that sketched by Bonney: leave us alone to enforce our commercial will.  
Like the gramophone companies, APRA rejected the idea, embraced by 
the users of musical copyright, of a copyright tribunal. Like the 
recording industry, APRA preferred to settle disputes by exercising 
superior – usually overwhelming – bargaining power. If opponents 
were recalcitrant, it could rely on reserves of money and patience to win 
battles in the courts. It wielded the performing right like a magic wand, 
and though many complained, few dared to resist the obligation to pay 
performance fees. 
Markell presented APRA’s position at the Royal Commission with a 
masterly combination of boldness, evasion and guile. His response to 
probing about the disparity between fees paid by the ABC and the 
commercial radio stations illustrated his skill to perfection. Yes, the 
licence fees paid by the ABC dwarfed those collected from the B 
stations. But no, the ABC rates were not too high: rather, the 
commercial stations paid far too little. Why the disparity? Because, 
frankly, government organisations met their legal obligations, 
negotiated agreements on realistic terms and paid on demand.  
Commercial organisations, by contrast, willingly avoided legal 
obligations if they could. To secure their compliance meant time and 
effort. For this reason, Markell told Owen, APRA had at first been 
satisfied with obtaining from the B Class stations nominal payments 
that represented a tiny fraction of their total advertising revenues. It 
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now intended to demand much higher fees that represented the real 
value of copyright music to the stations. 
On the subject of a tribunal, Markell proved equally forthright. The 
institution of a tribunal, or the passing of legislative amendments 
providing for compulsory arbitration might “encourage the spirit of 
reasonableness’ but ‘that is a very doubtful point.” The history of 
conciliation in Australia after the passing of the arbitration legislation 
had “not been what one had hoped, but rather it ranged the parties on 
opposite sides.” According to Markell, sometimes “when you range 
people on opposite sides of a table you raise a spirit of antagonism.” If 
there was to be a tribunal, however, it must be an institution of last 
resort, adopting flexible procedure and presided over by a member of 
the judiciary, preferably a member of the High Court.  
Markell became less direct when the Commissioner asked him to 
respond to the complaints made by users about APRA. APRA could 
not deliver the transparency of process that critics demanded. Any 
requirement to provide a comprehensive list of authors and composers 
on whose behalf the Association collected fees imposed an impossible 
burden: through its association with other performing right societies 
around the world, APRA’s repertoire comprised millions of works.  
To provide accurate statements of distributions to authors or 
composers was also too difficult. APRA remitted the great bulk of 
money collected in Australia to the Performing Right Society in Britain 
and it could not compel its British cousin to provide distribution 
information. In any case, distributions were often based on the records 
of music use, such as submitted broadcaster playlists, and users often 
made inaccurate attributions. Accordingly, a large sum of money 
collected could not be immediately distributed and must instead be held 
in a general trust fund. 
As to the criticism that APRA worked in the interests of music 
publishers not the creators of music, Markell pointed out that the 
authors and composers constituted half the membership of the board 
of the PRS. In other performing right societies, said Markell, the author 
predominated. Though publishers monopolised APRA’s board, the 
miniscule number of music creators in Australia meant that the 
publishers of foreign authors and composers must necessarily dominate 
the Association. About 99 per cent of music played in Australia 
originated abroad and it was only through foreign publishers, or their 
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local representatives, that APRA could hope to remunerate the 
originators of the music. 
APRA’s objections to the proposed tribunal and method 
of determining fees  
Markell demurred at proposals that aimed to impose restraints on the 
use of the performing right. Compulsory arbitration to fix conditions 
for playing music he called bad in principle. Parties should be left to 
themselves to strike commercial bargains and government should  
not interfere with the contractual process In any case, said Markell, 
legislation would be ultra vires: Australia had failed to ratify the Rome 
Conference amendments within the scheduled period, and the  
Berne Convention minus the Rome revisions did not permit  
legislative restriction of the performing right. Additionally the British 
Copyright Act of 1911, adopted in the Australian legislation, did not 
contemplate restriction. 
Markell’s submissions are chiefly interesting for the light they shed on 
APRA’s approach to valuing licensed music, and its pragmatic 
emphasis on optimising returns from its most pliable licensee, namely 
government. His arguments against legislation are of less relevance, 
though they seem to reinforce the contention of contemporary critics 
that exclusive collecting societies tend to exhibit the classic behavioural 
patterns of the monopolist: dislike of scrutiny or accountability, solitary 
focus on maximising returns and the arbitrary fixing of price. 
Markell summed up APRA’s approach in his explanation of the 
different approaches taken by his clients to the ABC and the B Class 
stations. For APRA, the key difference between the two lay in the fact 
that the Commonwealth funded the national broadcaster using a fixed 
percentage of revenue collected from listeners’ fees. As Markell 
implied, in APRA’s eyes, secure government funding meant continuing 
capacity – and willingness – to pay at a higher rate. 
The B Class stations, he said, were “in business for profit, therefore we 
make them a very much smaller charge than if they were subsidised by 
the Government.” The ABC, APRA found far more amenable: 
When we are dealing with the Government we have not to bother about whether it is 
paying its way; we simply say “We are entitled to this”, and the Government says 
“Yes, we want to use your music.” It is a matter of plain business; but that is not 
the case with the B Class stations, where the position is that we have erred on the 
side of charging them too little. 
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On the subject of fixing licence fees, Markell explained that APRA 
adopted a purely pragmatic approach: it took the most money from the 
most secure source and spent little time on trying to determine criteria 
to objectively determine the value of copyright music. He said: 
Our revenue from the sale of phonograph records and sheet music is very small; as 
our remuneration from those sources is so small, that factor has to be taken into 
consideration in saying what is a reasonable payment in the case of broadcasting. I 
think that is a fair way to put it. 
But trying to objectively value music involved “a very difficult inquiry 
… [i]t is almost impossible to arrive at it.” On this point, the 
Commissioner agreed. Owen told Markell that he recognised that in 
valuing an intangible, “[t]here are one thousand and one things to 
consider.” His solution to the difficulty prefigured the approach 
adopted by the modern Australian Copyright Tribunal – the “first thing 
I would look to,” he said, “is what the parties have done.” Negotiated 
agreement, Owen seemed to suggest, implied some element of free 
consent and therefore fairness – thus, how could a tribunal determine a 
fair licence fee “except by what they [the parties] agreed to take”. 
Seizing his opportunity, Markell observed that “any fee must be 
arbitrary.” To try to establish valuation criteria was unnecessary. “As I 
said in the first instance,” he pointed out, “the actual question of 
reasonableness in the fee is not of very great importance.” Markell 
posed a rhetorical query: 
Is there any reason under these circumstances to upset the primary rule which I think 
everybody will admit is best in the long run, that is, to leave the parties to do what 
they think is a reasonable thing under the circumstances?’ 
Turning to APRA’s method of charging the B Class stations on a per 
item basis, Markell and the Commissioner found themselves in accord: 
Mr Markell It does seem to be a very fair scheme, and though all 
things in this inquiry, as far as paying a fee is 
concerned, must be on an arbitrary basis because 
there is no standard comparison … 
 
The Commissioner Music has no value excepting of an arbitrary  
nature; you cannot assess its value except in an 
arbitrary way. 
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Mr Markell  So it must be arbitrary at the inception. 
 
However, Markell carefully enunciated the need for principle over 
arbitrariness if a particular factor could be interpreted in APRA’s 
favour. The most important principle to recognise, in the age of 
broadcasting, was that size of audience dictated size of licence fee. 
“Once it is established,” he said, “that the principle of a larger audience 
means possibly more compensation, and that is a larger amount, then it 
is only a question of how much.” 
Though not likely to provide insight into the philosophical question of 
a musical work’s intrinsic value, the principle of audience size  
made sense if applied to the commercial broadcasters. They relied  
on audience share to attract advertisers and it could be argued  
that the value they placed on licensed music grew as their share of 
listeners increased.  
The principle could not so easily applied to the ABC, which paid APRA 
much more in licence fees than the commercial broadcasters. Markell 
could not enlighten Owen as to why its larger national audience implied 
the official broadcaster, providing a service without regard to 
commercial considerations, should pay higher fees. He simply said: “we 
are entitled to an increased charge anyway because it reaches a greater 
number of people, that is as far as I can put it your Honour.” 
Returning to his theme that fixing a licence fee could not be done 
without some resort to arbitrary calculation, Markell suggested both 
that both the ABC and commercial broadcasters should be required to 
pay APRA fees equivalent to 10 per cent of annual listeners’ licence 
payments. He did not bother to explain why 10 per cent represented 
fair remuneration, arguing only that as both broadcasters and the public 
craved copyright music, both should be prepared to pay a sizeable toll 
for the privilege of hearing that music.  
“I submit,” he said, “that the public has no right to use our property 
without paying reasonable fees.” Markell considered it axiomatic that 
“[i]f you wish to have the music you want, you must be prepared to pay 
a reasonable price for it.” In any case, “I am not sure that the public 
objects to paying this amount.” The case for payment by broadcasters 
followed more directly. The industry, and the social phenomenon, of 
broadcasting would not have been possible without the supply of 
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copyright music, and broadcasters must pay a proper price for using 
what was for them an indispensable commodity. 
The commercial radio stations  
Of all the commercial users of music represented at the Commission, 
the B Class commercial stations most cogently pressed the case for the 
users of copyright music. Owen, as he observed to Markell towards the 
end of hearings, regarded the submissions of their barrister, Richard 
Cook, a replacement at short notice for the stations’ first counsel, Clive 
Evatt, as a tour de force.  
Cook delivered a sustained attack on the practices and arguments of, 
first, APRA, and next, the gramophone companies. He enunciated a 
single theme: a tribunal must be established to ensure that users could 
avoid commercial oppression. Only an independent arbitrator could 
prevent the suppliers of music from misusing their bargaining power to 
insist on conditions that restricted the supply, and increased the cost, of 
music delivered to the public. 
Perhaps the outstanding virtue of Cook’s address lay in his simple 
appeal for consideration of a neglected interest group – the public. He 
did not discuss at length how copyright music might be valued or the 
terms on which is should be licensed. Instead he emphasised that the 
public wanted music and the B Class stations supplied the public need 
in the most populated and the remotest parts of the country.  
If APRA, through high prices, or the associated manufacturers, through 
the radio ban, restricted supply, the public suffered as much as his 
clients. Cook suggested symbiosis in the needs of the everyday listener 
and commercial radio stations: 
When one takes these factors into consideration I submit it can be claimed with 
certainty that there is a public interest in any question which affect the life blood 
of the industry, that is music, and in view of that the desirability of the 
legislature’s intervention arises. 
Artfully, he insinuated that the suppliers of commercial music had each 
become a public menace. The need for a tribunal, he said, became clear 
“when one finds that you have a combination controlling an essential 
commodity and that that combination is dealing with an industry that is 
of public importance.” The associated manufacturers displayed the 
worst attributes of monopolists. While the gramophone companies 
pretended that they imposed the radio ban to defeat ruinous 
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competition from broadcasters, in truth, they intended prohibition to 
maximise profits and drive radio stations out of business. 
Cook proposed that the Government legislate to make arbitration of 
copyright licensing disputes compulsory once attempts at negotiation 
were exhausted. The principle of arbitration as a last resort greatly 
impressed Owen, who repeatedly made clear his opinion that any 
tribunal must be regarded as the last – rather than first – step taken 
towards determining rates. According to Cook, for an arbitral system to 
work, parties must first expect to try to resolve commercial disputes by 
negotiation. Under his proposed scheme, if they could not reach 
agreement they should try to appoint an arbitrator to hear evidence and 
make a ruling. If they could not agree an arbitrator, the Minister should 
be empowered to constitute an arbitral tribunal. The ruling of an 
arbitrator or tribunal so appointed would be a “common rule” binding 
on the parties.  
Above all, he said, the public interest in access to the plentiful supply of 
commercial music must be maintained. The B Class stations were  
the people’s voice. Cook told Owen that the oppressive commercial 
conduct of both APRA and the record manufacturers showed why  
the Commissioner should reject their arguments in favour of  
absolute freedom of negotiation. Only the possibility of recourse to an 
arbitral tribunal, said Cook, would restore harmony to the world of 
commercial music. 
Cook also attacked Bonney’s arguments for the mechanical performing 
right. If the copyright legislation described copyright as a ‘sole’ right, 
then either the author or the record manufacturer owned copyright but 
not both. The legislature undoubtedly intended the author (or assign) to 
be the ‘sole’ owner of copyright. Under section 19 of the British Act, 
copyright in records subsisted “as if” records were musical works, but 
for one purpose only: to enable the record manufacturer to sue 
counterfeiters for pirating records. The recommendations of the 
Gorrell Committee, the transcripts of its proceedings, and the 
parliamentary debates leading to the passing of the British Act, showed 
that legislators intended to confer a purely defensive copyright – the 
right to prevent unauthorised reproductions of records.  
Support for APRA 
John Keating, counsel assisting the Commission, now 61 years of age, 
seemed to enjoy reprising his old Parliamentary role as an arbiter of 
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copyright destinies. As he did in the Senate in 1905, he began his final 
address to the Royal Commission by delivering a long and learned 
history of the copyright law. He then reached his starting premise: the 
musical performing right could not be impeached. APRA, as assignee, 
enjoyed the right absolutely. Only Parliament could abolish the 
performing right and so long as Parliament respected the long 
provenance of the right in British law, or considered itself bound by the 
Berne Convention, it would take no such step. 
Keating concluded that APRA’s rates seemed reasonable. He said, “I 
do not think there is anything in the evidence that has come before 
your Honour on the part of any witness which supports an objection to 
the quantum of APRA’s charges.” Owen replied that he considered it, 
“impossible to say on the present state of the evidence and [it] would 
be most unjust to say that their charges were extortionate or anything 
of that kind, but they do make certain charges which certain users 
object to very strongly, and give their reasons.” 
Keating went on to endorse APRA’s function as the mediator of 
collective rights: 
There is nothing, therefore, on the face of it to say that an organisation like APRA 
in Australia or the PRS in England is an organization which should not exist; it 
may serve a very useful purpose … it would be practically impossible for the persons 
whom the law gives rights under the Copyright Acts to be adequately protected and 
their rights adequately guarded were it not for some such combination. 
Necessity for controls over performing right 
Keating openly acknowledged that an unfettered right, such as the 
performing right, or a putative right, like the mechanical performing 
right, when combined with commercial strength, offered to its holder 
great temptation: the possibility of rapid enrichment gained at  
possibly ruinous cost to those who asked to be licensed to exercise  
the right. 
Parliament must, suggested Keating, introduce controls to ensure that 
the holder of performing rights could not wield those rights like an 
absolute monarch but must instead submit, where necessary, to the 
injunctions of civil authority. If created, said Keating, a copyright 
tribunal would most likely bring the APRA wars to an end, and restrain 
the record manufacturers, if they secured common law recognition of 
the mechanical performing right. 
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But how could Parliament introduce controls? APRA claimed that 
international law and the policy of the British Copyright Act prohibited 
the Government from placing any limitations on the performing right. 
Treaty obligations, according to the collecting society, provided the 
strongest argument against government action. While the Rome 
Conference amended the Berne Convention to allow legislatures to 
impose restrictions on the broadcasting right, Australia had not yet 
ratified the Rome amendments, and the expiry date for ratification  
had passed.  
The unamended Berne Convention, which admitted no limitation on 
the performing right, bound Australia. When passing the 1911 
Copyright Act, the British legislature implemented the 1908 Berlin 
Conference amendments to the Berne Convention, intending that the 
performing right should apply without restriction. Only the compulsory 
recording licence imposed a restriction on the operation of an exclusive 
right, in this case the right to make a recording. According to APRA, 
unless Australia intended to endanger what Keating called 
“international comity” and “inter-imperial comity” on copyright 
questions, it could take no action to restrict the performing right. 
Hearing these arguments, Owen expressed his concern about 
recommending any action that could be considered in breach of 
international law or offensive to the spirit of the Berne Union or the 
intent of the British Copyright Act. His counsel, however, did not share 
his fears. Keating told Owen of his certainty that Parliament could 
legislate to restrict the application of the performing right. He 
expressed confidence that he could turn APRA’s arguments over the 
requirements of international law, and legislative policy, on their head, 
and prove that Australia could pass laws to restrict the exercise of the 
performing right.  
Keating made his case with subtlety and ingenuity. APRA, he said, 
reasoned from the correct premise. The Commonwealth must respect 
authors’ rights. Whether Australia was, by elapse of time, debarred 
from ratifying the Rome Conference amendments, he did not know, 
though he did not think so. If Australia did, in the future, ratify the 
amendments, then the legislature could impose legislative restrictions 
on the broadcasting right without difficulty.  
Australia, said Keating, must certainly avoid legislative action that 
curtailed authors’ rights. But, he went on, no treaty obligation, or legal 
policy, stood in the way of legislation that imposed limits on the 
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assignees, or licensees, of authors. The Berne Convention and the 
British Copyright Act recognised the assignability of copyright. APRA, 
the assignee of composers and authors, possessed in full the legal title 
to the musical performing right. However, the Convention and the 
British Copyright Act were intended to benefit authors and creators not 
their assigns or licensees.  
As Keating pointed out, the Berlin Revision Conference in 1908 
amended the Berne Convention to excise references to the author’s 
“lawful representatives” or publishers. The new Article 4, which 
replaced the old Article 2 omitted references to personal representatives 
and in Article 6, which replaced Article 3, “publishers were swept off 
the map, and the privileges of the Convention were confined to 
authors.”11  
The Convention, said Keating, “is intended for authors and authors 
only. It is not for the assignees, not for their lawful representatives 
even; it originally was, but it is not now.” In his view, a plain reading of 
Article 4: 
leaves it impossible to avoid or escape the inference that the Berlin Convention 
Article 4 as it stands today has no application whatever to such a body as APRA 
or to any merger or combination or persons or bodies corporate or unincorporated, 
such as the associated manufacturers. They have been outside the scope of the 
Conventions since 1908. 
Power to create a tribunal and nature of tribunal 
As assignee, APRA could exercise the exclusive rights and enforce its 
copyright, but it possessed “no standing under the Convention”. The 
Association, said Keating, had legal standing “in general law as the 
assignee or as the attorney” of authors, “but not under the [British 
Copyright] Act”. While the Convention constrained the Government 
from passing legislation that restricted the rights of authors, it in no 
way prevented the creation of a tribunal that would regulate APRA’s 
conduct. Rights conferred on the author through the legislative 
implementation of treaty obligations were inviolable, unless treaty 
amendment permitted qualification. However, once assigned, the rights 
were no longer unassailable. If the assignee exercised rights contrary to 
                                                     
11 Keating said of Article 6, “Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the deliberate 
intent of the Convention at Berlin in 1908 to restrict the privileges and benefits of 
the Convention to authors and authors alone.” 
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the public interest, the legislature could impose restrictions in the 
public interest.  
The Commonwealth could, said Keating, legislate to create a copyright 
tribunal, and it should do so. But the tribunal should function as the 
forum of last resort. The parties to a dispute ought to be encouraged to 
resolve differences by ordinary commercial means and only after 
making best efforts to reach agreement should they refer the dispute 
for determination by an independent referee.  
The tribunal should therefore be an occasional forum convened by a 
senior judge as circumstances demanded, and conducted with the 
minimum of procedural formality. The principle of “no discrimination” 
would apply to tribunal determinations. In other words, rates and 
conditions determined by the tribunal would apply to the whole class of 
users not simply to the party to proceedings. If the tribunal determined 
licence conditions to apply to one radio station, other stations could 
demand from APRA similar licences. 
APRA’s reporting obligations 
With these conclusions, Owen enthusiastically agreed. He gave more 
cautious assent to Keating’s succeeding propositions. APRA, declared 
Keating, appeared to conduct itself honourably, but it held a monopoly 
over musical performing rights, and any monopolist could abuse its 
power. The tribunal could force APRA to accept licensing conditions 
that reflected ordinary standards of reasonableness. But any individual 
or organisation lacking means would by necessity shun tribunal 
proceedings and be forced to accept whatever licence APRA offered.  
It was crucial, therefore, to expose APRA’s fees and distributions to 
public scrutiny. Parliament, Keating declared, should be asked to pass 
legislation requiring APRA to report annually on its sources of income 
and distributions. Critics of APRA told the Commission that they did 
not object to paying reasonable licence fees if they could be assured 
that the payments reached the individual composers of music. But they 
disliked charges seemingly calculated by reference to a single yardstick, 
the need to increase the revenues of publishers. Let APRA demonstrate 
in annual reports that it benefited the originators, said Keating. 
Additionally, APRA should be compelled to indemnify the subjects of 
mistaken copyright infringement claims.  
Keating rejected the argument that APRA could not supply meaningful 
distribution reports since it remitted most funds collected to the 
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Performing Right Society. Reporting income and the tiny proportion of 
receipts distributed in Australia would impose discipline on APRA and 
the Australian precedent might encourage other jurisdictions, including 
the United Kingdom, to require their performing right societies to 
publish similar statements. In the foreseeable future, APRA could 
simply ask the PRS for lists of distributions made from income 
collected in Australia.  
Keating on the gramophone companies 
Keating spoke with less certainty about the associated manufacturers. 
He declared himself perplexed by, “the indefinite policy and course of 
conduct of the gramophone manufacturers”. Bonney claimed a 
mechanical performance right for the manufacturers, and justified the 
claim at length, but he would not say unequivocally that the record 
companies intended to rely on the right to enforce the radio ban. On 
the other hand, they would not say definitely that they asserted the right 
to withhold supply of records under patents legislation. Nor would they 
predict for how long they intended to maintain the ban. 
At any rate, said Keating, the “position is a very serious one so far as 
Australia is concerned.” The ban threatened the future of B Class 
broadcasters. While he could think of no definite recommendation, 
something needed to be done. He suggested the Government should 
not be shy about tackling the record companies. In 1911, they acquired 
copyright in records in “a peculiar way” and the compulsory recording 
licence in no way placed them on an equal footing with authors as the 
intended beneficiaries of exclusive rights. 
Until successfully contested, said Keating, the 1929 Chancery case 
Thompson v Warner Bros stood as authority for the principle that 
copyright legislation conferred no performing right on the 
manufacturers of gramophone records. They could not justify the ban 
on the basis that the broadcasters infringed their performing right in 
records. Relying on patents law to maintain the ban was only slightly 
less problematic. If the Government saw “any disposition on the part 
of the manufacturers to abuse the concessions and privileges’ of 
patents law, it should respond as it ‘in its wisdom thinks fit.” 
As Keating and Owen agreed, a tribunal determining licensing 
conditions would not assist the radio broadcasters affected by the radio 
ban. The jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal could not extend to 
deciding questions of law, including the legality of the radio ban. 
 
219 
Keating then issued a veiled warning to the associated manufacturers. 
He suggested that if the radio ban continued, the Commonwealth could 
attack their conduct under the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 – 
“an Act against monopolies” as Keating called it.  
The question of the public interest 
Keating ended his address by suggesting that copyright policy makers 
should consult the public interest when making policy. In the present 
instance, the “public interest is increasing because the demand on the 
part of the public is being stimulated by the very activities of the radio 
broadcasting stations.” What the public needed should be the measure 
of how government determined policy. To hear music over the radio, 
the public depended on APRA and the broadcasters to reach 
agreement. “So the public is vitally interested in all relations between 
those two huge bodies.” The public “[is] vitally interested in seeing that 
they work together harmoniously” and the simple objective of 
government must be to bring accord to their relations. 
The Royal Commissioner adopted a more pragmatic view: 
The whole question to my mind is to what extent should the conflict between those 
rights of public demand, assuming the public interest is there, to what extent and in 
what way should these differences be adjusted. 
Owen’s approach more truly anticipated the attitude of future copyright 
policy makers, who (despite contrary declarations) allowed political 
considerations, rather than abstractions such as the public interest, to 
guide policy formation. He declared himself attentive to the needs of 
APRA. “Any method,” he said, “of unjustly dealing with the controllers 
of this extraordinary asset [music copyright] is greatly to be deprecated, 
there is no question about that.” 
Owen’s sympathy for APRA did not result from political calculation. 
Like most officers of government institutions, he reflexively favoured 
the interests of property. The social and economic effects of APRA’s 
stranglehold on the performing right did not much concern him. For 
the Royal Commissioner, an upstanding and highly conscientious man, 
a property right sanctioned by treaty, and adopted by the imperial 
legislature, must be right in principle. As custodian of the right, APRA, 
which in any case appeared to conduct its affairs reasonably, should be 
treated with primary consideration. 
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Owen, however, took no part of his commission lightly. He told 
Keating that the whole question of the performing right “impresses my 
mind at the moment and makes me anxious and troubled.”  
The Commissioner was sensitive to the public’s need for music. He 
referred Keating to an article in the April 1931 edition of the Journal of 
Radio Law, which examined the discussion of the rights of the public at 
the Rome Conference. In the article, the author,  
Dr W Hoffman referred to the subordination of private to public  
(or ‘State’) interest: 
Thus the right of the individual and the right of the public strongly conflict with each 
other in broadcasting and, at the Conference of Rome, M. Giannini had to employ 
all his skill to succeed in bringing together the divergent interests in the compromise 
formula of Article 11 bis of which the Committee’s report justly said,  
“The subcommittee wished thus to harmonise the rights of the author with the 
general interests of the State, to which individual interests should particularly  
submit themselves.”12  
Keating responded that the suppliers and users of commercial music 
“ought to be brought together, and the public is vitally interested in 
seeing that they work together harmoniously.” Owen acknowledged the 
point. The best the Commission could do was to recommend certain 
actions to allow the Government to better regulate performing rights.  
And, as both men agreed, the most efficacious way of producing 
commercial harmony, at least in the case of the musical performing 
right, was to create a tribunal. The tribunal should headed by a judge 
and constituted occasionally, on demand, as a last resort. It should be  
able to determine licensing terms in a flexible, efficient and relatively 
informal manner and create precedents to guide future commercial 
relations.
                                                     
12 Dr W Hoffman article on Rome Convention in Journal of Radio Law, April 1931. 
